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Drawing on a household and village-level community 
survey of social income, this paper offers a critique of the 
widespread use of targeting in Indian social policy 
primarily through the use of the below poverty line card 
system, to include or exclude groups from access to 
subsidised goods and sometimes to public works. It 
argues that targeting is inefficient and inequitable. In 
India, this situation is largely an outcome of the 
bureaucratic raj, which has created a vast system of 
clogged pipes. While successive governments have 
dismantled state controls and interventions for the 
private sector, delivery of services, especially to the poor, 
is still firmly controlled by the same bureaucratic system, 
with its attendant problems. Given the limitations of 
targeting, the principle of universalism is worth 
considering as an alternative.
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A lthough India has a very impressive economic growth record over the past two decades, it does not have the  same achievements in implementing social policies 
that could reduce poverty, income insecurity and income 
inequality. The reality is that the number of people classified 
as poor has barely declined, in spite of the fact that the number 
is calculated by using a very meagre poverty line, which the 
Planning Commission itself has described as “much too low” 
(2007: 128). From about 32 crore people in 1993-94, the number 
may have fallen to 30.1 crore by 2004-05, according to the 
Eleventh Plan. 
Drawing on a household and village-level community survey 
of social income conducted in 2008 (Standing et al 2010), this 
article offers a critique of the widespread use of targeting in 
Indian social policy, primarily through the use of the below 
poverty line (BPL) card system. Many schemes, at state and cen-
tral levels make use of such targeting, combined with a complex 
set of selectivity criteria, by which groups are identified as the 
deserving poor or excluded from entitlement to targeted benefits 
of one kind or another, mostly in the form of subsidised goods but 
also in terms of access to public works.
In international debates on social protection, targeting is one 
of four key notions currently in vogue. Targeting usually means 
directing benefits to those deemed as in need and regarded as 
“deserving” of help. By selectivity, commentators usually mean 
directing benefits to a specified group, such as those belonging to 
a particular caste, whose members are expected to be in greatest 
need of assistance. The National Old Age Pension Scheme 
(NOAPS) is just one example of this. 
By universal, what is usually meant is that the entire popula-
tion is entitled, or all citizens or all residents; this conveys a sense 
of a right. Finally, by conditionality, what is usually meant is that 
potential recipients must conform to a specified list of behavioural 
conditions.1 We will not deal with conditionality in this paper. 
However, it is currently popular in Indian policymaking circles, 
ironically just as those who had put faith in conditionality else-
where have been coming to appreciate its limitations.
Several valuable articles on cash transfers recently in the 
Economic & Political Weekly all notably accepted the desirability 
of targeting and selectivity (for example, Kapur, Mukhopadhyay 
and Subramaniam 2008). The major claim of this paper is that 
the failure of social policy is largely due to reliance on a complex 
mix of targeting and selectivity mechanisms, which together 
have created a sprawling and hugely expensive “clogged pipes” 
system that cannot be unblocked by tinkering reforms. 
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What Targeting Means
Internationally, the main means by which social assistance, or 
poverty alleviation, has been targeted is by identifying those 
whose income falls below some designated subsistence level, 
although sometimes it has been done by identifying those whose 
assets, or wealth, are below some threshold level.
In India, as elsewhere, the conventional argument made in 
favour of targeting is deceptively simple, and is roughly as follows. 
India is a “poor” country, and cannot “afford” a comprehensive 
social protection system, so it must concentrate its limited 
resources on those most in need. Therefore, it must target the 
poorest, providing a “safety net” for those in need who are 
“deserving” of assistance. Every point in that sequence of reason-
ing should prompt awkward questions. Nevertheless, targeting 
has been part of the Washington Consensus policies, and as such, 
conventional wisdom, for the past two decades. 
In India, the first systematic national attempt at targeting was 
in 1992 during the Eighth Plan, when income was used as a criterion 
for identifying families BPL and a nation-wide survey was under-
taken to identify them. Ever since, targeting has been accepted 
practice, and has mirrored international practice. As one early 
review (Besley and Kanbur 1990: 2) put it, 
Indeed, targeting has become a panacea in the area of poverty allevia-
tion, whence it is suggested that policymakers can have their cake and 
eat it too – improved targeting means that more poverty alleviation 
could be achieved with less expenditure! 
As such, targeting has been hailed as being cost-effective, even 
though it has not had much, if any redistributive effect (Roth-
stein 2001), nor is there much evidence as to its effectiveness in 
removing poverty. 
Targeting does raise some larger issues. It is a moot point 
whether it is consistent with the commitments made in the 
Indian Constitution. At Independence, the country adopted the 
goal of social insurance. In Article 41 of the Constitution of India, 
it is asserted that: 
[T]he State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and devel-
opment, make effective provision for securing the right to work, to 
education and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, 
sickness and disablement and in other cases of undeserved want. 
While the optimistic rhetorical commitment has never been trans-
lated into reality, we suggest that targeting seems to go against the 
grain of the Constitution. That aside, definitionally, targeting re-
quires the authorities to identify those deemed to have an inade-
quate income, which requires complex, time-consuming and ex-
pensive household surveys in order to apply the so-called “means 
test”. The problems start with the difficulties of identifying what is 
covered by income, and with measuring non-money components 
of income. Then there is the problem of variability of income. This 
is particularly great among lower-income earners outside salaried 
employment. Most of the self-employed and those doing flexible or 
informal contract or wage labour have highly variable incomes. 
This is the situation of most Indian workers. They are not 
alone. Rather than generating a gradual shift to regular, salaried 
employment, globalisation has been creating a growing precariat 
(the growing class of “precariously” employed “proletariat”). If 
their income is assessed in one week, it may be dramatically 
different in another week. But the BPL system relies on classify-
ing someone as poor or not poor on a survey carried out every 
few years. In the survey discussed later, we asked respondents 
whether their income had risen, fallen or stayed the same over 
the previous year. A majority said it had changed. There is noth-
ing particularly surprising about that, but policymakers who rely 
on poverty lines implicitly presume that incomes do not change. 
A literature exists on these issues, and we will not try to sum-
marise the findings here. Bear in mind that an ostensible princi-
ple of targeting is that a benefit is provided today to someone 
who is in poverty today. But when were the data identifying the 
person as poor collected? More often than not, they will have 
been collected two or three years earlier, and these will be used 
to classify someone as poor or not-poor for several more years. 
So, today someone may be treated as poor or non-poor according 
to what somebody measured them as being one week five years 
ago. This would only conceivably make sense in a static social 
landscape, which is quite unlike the India of the 21st century.
Because of the widely observed failings of means testing, there 
have been attempts to develop what is called proxy means test-
ing, whereby visible indicators of poverty or wealth, such as 
housing quality, are used that are supposed to be highly corre-
lated with income poverty. This methodology began in Chile in 
1980, and since that time it has been tried out in about 80 coun-
tries. The trouble is that it is subject to very large type 1 and type 
2 errors (described in greater detail below), and is costly to ad-
minister. Even sophisticated statistical models identify the poor 
only about 50% of the time. And it also generates immoral haz-
ards, i e, acts of deception induced by a perception of unfairness 
or arbitrariness. For instance, if people find out (as they should) 
that possession of a particular good would remove them from 
entitlement to benefits, they would be likely to do without that 
particular good or conceal it or conceal the true ownership of it. 
And, finally, collecting the information would take time, and 
thus refer to some distant past rather than a reality today.
So far, we have considered targeting as based on means tests 
and proxy means tests. Policymakers in India and elsewhere also 
use geographical targeting, whereby they identify areas where 
incomes are generally low and then allocate benefits to all those 
living there or to those identified as poor living there. This 
method is particularly crude, although it has the administrative 
advantage of being relatively easy to implement. It leads to hori-
zontal inequality, whereby the poor in one area benefit more 
than the equally poor in another. And anybody who is poor in a 
non-poor area is excluded. 
Then there is categorical targeting, i e, giving state benefits or 
services just to those identified as poor who also fit into some so-
cial category. A topical Indian example is to target benefits to 
low-income families with up to two children; those having more 
than two are excluded, in order to discourage high fertility. This 
is clearly unfair on third children, who will have done nothing to 
deserve to be malnourished compared to other children. Although 
there is no evidence that such targeting has resulted in lower 
fertility, if the financial incentive were to have the effect intended 
by the design of the targeting mechanism, then it would encour-
age unsavoury attitudes and behaviour.2 
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Economic & Political Weekly EPW  June 26, 2010 vol xlv nos 26 & 27 241
Then think of another currently popular form of categorical 
targeting, using the rule that “a single woman who has been 
deserted” should automatically be counted as someone who 
should receive the BPL card and thus receive state benefits. This 
requires that a woman declare herself as “deserted”, or find an 
authority to declare her as “deserted”, which many women would 
be ashamed to do. It would also leave out many women who may 
not be deserted technically but who are not supported by their 
husbands. And this sort of policy can encourage several immoral 
hazards, even if one can only speculate on them in the absence of 
empirical research, such as feigning desertion or bribing officials 
to accept a claim to being deserted. 
Finally, there is a peculiar notion of self-targeting. Bear in 
mind that it is the intention of policymakers that should be 
subject to scrutiny here. Essentially, the intention is to deter those 
not in financial need from applying for benefits, and to do this, 
the idea is to make people come forward to declare and display 
their poverty. This could only work if the display was stigmatis-
ing, even traumatising. But if this is the intention, it implies that 
humiliation is a deliberate part of social policy. 
One does not dispute that in India, many groups want to have 
themselves declared poor. Many castes have lobbied intensively 
to be declared as “backward”, and there have been many violent 
agitations because a caste has not been declared poor and back-
ward. In India, self-targeting is mainly in schemes involving 
manual labour, the conventional argument being that only those 
who need it will undertake such hard labour. 
In the remainder of this article, we will focus on aspects and 
outcomes of targeting and selectivity in general, rather than one 
particular form of either. We believe the criticisms apply to a 
greater or lesser extent to all forms of targeting, and that the 
main outcome has been one of clogged pipes, by which those in 
need in India see far less benefit than they should.
General Criticisms of Targeting
One argument made in favour of targeting is that social benefits, 
in money or in services, are only a boost to consumption expendi-
ture, and that they crowd out investment and lower economic 
growth. This is at best unproven, and probably wrong, as the 
World Bank has recently accepted. Social and economic spending 
blur into one another. Better nourished children make for students 
who learn better and who go on to make more productive citizens 
and workers; healthier people not only reduce the demands on 
the healthcare system but also foster economic growth.
Targeting schemes are invariably costly to administer. There 
are high administrative costs and high transaction costs imposed 
on those contemplating applying for a benefit. It is also stigmatis-
ing, since the person must display his or her poverty. This con-
tributes to what is almost always a low take-up rate, even in the 
most developed welfare states.
The low take-up rate is part of what is described as type 1 
error, i e, that some of the intended beneficiaries do not receive 
the benefit. There are many reasons for a high type 1 error, 
including ignorance, fear, stigma, inability of the intended re-
cipient to afford to apply for benefits, bureaucratic inefficiency, 
and unintended or blatant discrimination. In addition, there is 
type 2 error, i e, the tendency for a targeted scheme to include 
some of those for whom, under the design criteria, it is not 
intended. This is usually much higher than policy designers or 
commentators envisage.
Targeting schemes usually also entail what are usually called 
“poverty traps”. If a person is receiving a state benefit only 
because he or she is poor, then there is a disincentive to try to 
become non-poor, because the person would risk losing the 
entitlement to the benefit. In economic parlance, this is the 
equivalent of a very high marginal rate of taxation. This is a 
classic moral hazard. For a group of people on the margin, it 
actually pays not to work harder or to earn more by such work. 
But in addition, there is an immoral hazard, since the prospect of 
losing benefits means that the recipient will have an incentive to 
conceal the extra income or the earning activity that he or she is 
actually engaged in. Only a very naïve policymaker would think 
there is no moral hazard behaviour or imagine that their fellow 
citizens would not indulge in immoral hazard behaviour. If we 
were honest, we would admit that we would probably do the 
same if we were in the beneficiary’s position. 
Targeting in India Today
It should be evident that the design of the social protection system 
should respect the prevailing character of economic insecurity. 
In an industrial society, with a vast majority having stable full-
time employment with contracts and union-backed collective 
bargaining, one could make a reasonably good estimate of which 
groups were in need, and which not. This is not India today, and 
it will not be India in the future. In a globalising, open economy, 
more and more people will be subject to economic shocks and 
have to put up with systemic uncertainty, against which they will 
be unable to insure properly. Many more will be vulnerable to 
sudden declines in income. Targeting is, at best, only suitable for 
a situation of relative stability, an unchanging social structure 
and landscape, which is not the case in India today or likely to be 
the case in the foreseeable future.
In India, the base of the state benefit system in most parts of 
the country is the ration card, consisting of the BPL and above 
poverty line (APL) cards, although there is also the BPL ultra-poor 
card (Antyodaya). The central government determines the crite-
ria for defining the poor and ultra-poor through the National 
Sample Survey (NSS) surveys, which are conducted from time to 
time. The central government provides each state with an 
amount of funds based on the estimated percentage of the popu-
lation qualifying for BPL cards. Then the state governments try to 
keep the number of BPL card holders at no more than the number 
specified by the central government.
There have been many attempts at nationwide targeting since 
the 1980s; however each attempt revealed the limits of targeting 
and left out a very large number of families who needed help, 
while bringing in many more that could have done without it. 
The first large-scale BPL survey was undertaken in 1992, with 
family income being the sole criterion. This created many problems 
since it was very hard to measure income, while family size was 
not taken into account, so that many large families were excluded 
and small ones included.
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The next nationwide survey, in 1997, attempted to correct the 
earlier problems. It dropped the income criteria and was 
conducted in two stages. The first had five criteria by which to 
exclude the better-off, such as possessing two hectares or more of 
land or possessing valuable assets. The second stage involved 
measuring the value of family consumption through interviews. 
Again, this was all very complex and time-consuming. 
The next major survey, in 2002, adopted 13 socio-economic 
criteria for well-being, with a fancy score-based ranking carried 
out by the states. This method too proved to be problematic. An 
expert group of the Ministry of Rural Development (2009) later 
concluded from the 61st round of the NSS (2004-05) that 61% of 
households that were BPL on the basis of consumption figures 
were excluded from the BPL lists, and only 5% of the very poorest 
for whom the Antyodaya card was intended actually had them. 
In sum, the practical problems of identifying criteria for deter-
mining the poverty status of families have a record that should 
make it hard to have much faith in the whole process. 
Implementation of the scheme has also been far from perfect 
(Mehrotra and Mander 2009). Some states, especially in the 
south of the country, contend that they have many more people 
living below the BPL than shown by the NSS survey, and hence 
issue more BPL cards. As for the APL card, many people remain 
confused about whether or not they are entitled to it, and about 
what it offers. In many states, the APL cards are of two types. One 
is the “poor” APL and the other an “ordinary” APL. The “poor” APL 
card holders have to obtain a stamp on their card stating that 
their annual income is below Rs 1,00,000. An APL card holder 
with a stamp has entitlement to public distribution system 
(PDS) benefits; one without a stamp does not. The cards are also 
used for other purposes. For instance, in some states, they are be-
ing used as proof of residence, to obtain gas connections and 
credit cards, and as proof of Indian citizenship and state resi-
dence in the context of sons-of-the-soil movements. When think-
ing of reforming the BPL system, one should not forget the APL 
system, which is possibly as important.
Nevertheless, it is usually the BPL card and the PDS that are 
most scrutinised. The evidence on both is not encouraging. A 
survey of the subsidised food distribution system found that the 
beneficiaries were primarily from the middle class, due to their 
relatively strong social position and clientelism (Farrington et al 
2006). Another survey study found that the poorest and most 
vulnerable households found it particularly hard to be included 
on the BPL lists (Hirway 2003). Recently, the Planning Commis-
sion (2005) estimated that only 27% of the central government 
expenditure on the PDS reached low-income groups. In a speech 
to the National Development Council in New Delhi in December 
2007, the finance minister described the PDS as becoming “an al-
batross around our neck and an opportunity for rent seekers to 
enrich themselves”. Subsidies are almost certain to produce the 
clogged pipes that are the bane of Indian social policy. By con-
trast, direct cash transfers could allow people to purchase food 
more effectively than the complex PDS system.3 
These secondary findings are not encouraging. Now let us turn 
to the actual process of targeting as it works out in practice in 
India, armed with the image of a pipe in which the central and 
state governments pour money, ostensibly intended to alleviate 
income poverty and to enhance living standards of those deemed 
to be the poorest in the country. 
Awareness of and Application for State Benefits
There are six stages in obtaining any targeted state benefits – 
awareness of their existence, self-identification of being in need 
of assistance, self-identification of being entitled to particular 
benefits, application for the benefit, receipt of the means of ob-
taining the benefit (a card), and actual access to and use of the 
benefit. If one imagines the process of succeeding at each stage 
having a probability of less than one, we may begin to imagine 
how low the probability must be of passing through the whole 
process successfully. 
In 2008, with colleagues, we conducted a household and com-
munity survey in Gujarat, covering 1,500 households and key in-
formants from Ahmedabad city and 47 villages of Surendranagar 
district, which focused on all aspects of social income and eco-
nomic insecurity, including access to state benefits. In the course of 
this survey, respondents were asked about their awareness of the 
existence of BPL ration cards. Nearly one in every five people was 
unaware of their existence. As for awareness of targeted selective 
government schemes, we asked people if they were aware of any 
government schemes for the poor, and in response, a large number 
of schemes were mentioned – 38 in total, in most cases known to 
only a few. But knowledge of what they entailed or whether or not 
respondents thought they were entitled to them was very rare.4 
Of those aware of the BPL card, 81.7% thought they might qualify 
for it, and more of those who had experienced a decline in their 
income over the past year thought so. Given the actual number 
with a BPL card, that was obviously wishful thinking on the part 
of many people. However, it is notable that one in five respond-
ents from the scheduled castes (SCs) thought they would not 
qualify, 7% of scheduled tribe (ST) members and about 15% of 
Other Backward Classes (OBCs) thought they would not qualify. 
These figures point to a rarely mentioned problem with the ration 
card system. You have to think you qualify before you have a 
chance of obtaining a ration card! 
The fact that those whose incomes had declined in the past 
year were more likely to think they qualified for a BPL card also 
highlights one of the most distinctive failures of the ration card 
system. The procedures for obtaining entitlement are notoriously 
cumbersome and slow.
The survey identified various government schemes and asked 
if the household had applied for any of them. Just over one in five 
(21.5%) had applied. Again targeting shortcomings emerged. 
Although more people who had experienced a financial crisis in 
the past year had applied than those who had not (23.6% compared 
to 13.9%), most who had experienced a financial crisis were not 
applying for any targeted benefits, presumably because they did 
not think they were entitled to the type of help on offer or did not 
know whether they qualified or did not know how to apply.
Of those who had applied, nearly a third had not received the 
benefit, and of those receiving it, nearly a quarter had to wait 
more than six months before receiving it. Only about a quarter 
received it within a month. And, of those who had received 
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anything, 41.3% believed the amount was inadequate. A further 
failing was revealed when the figures were broken down by caste. 
Lower-caste people had to wait longer than upper-caste applicants, 
and were also less likely to have received the grants (Table 1).
Moreover, the higher the income of the household, the shorter 
the period between application and receipt of a state benefit, and 
the lower the probability that the household did not receive the 
benefit. While not surprising, this merely highlights the inequity 
of the design and the implementation of state benefits. 
We also asked about receipt of state benefits by those who 
believed they were entitled to them. About 60% of households 
believed that someone in the household qualified for a benefit 
and was not receiving it. Of these, nearly two-thirds had not 
received the benefit because they did not know how to apply, 
21.4% had applied but had been refused, and 15.2% were just too 
fearful of applying. Internationally, this is a pattern of responses 
that is quite normal. 
An additional point that should be emphasised is that, not sur-
prisingly, the illiterates who thought they qualified were the most 
likely to have failed in their attempts to obtain benefits. This, of 
course, is ironic, given that they were almost certainly among the 
most deprived. A system claiming to be targeting the poor that 
requires (or rewards) literacy is a contradiction in terms. Of those 
households believing they had one or more members qualifying 
for a state benefit, the main reason they gave for non-receipt was 
that they did not know how to apply. However, compared with 
about half of those with upper secondary schooling, that figure 
was 72.4% for illiterates (Table 3). In other words, the very group 
that was most likely to be impoverished were the most likely not 
to apply for them because of ignorance about how to do so.
As for actual possession of ration cards, it was revealing that 
those households that reported having experienced a financial 
crisis in the past year were no more likely to have a BPL card than 
those that had not. Only just over 29% of crisis-hit households 
held a BPL card, compared with 25% of those not having a crisis. 
Now consider the efficiency of the system by reference to some 
standard measures of social status and “capabilities”. Table 4 
shows that although casual labourers were the most likely to 
have a BPL card, piece-rate home-based workers were the least 
likely of the work-status groups to have them. While substantial 
numbers of all work-status groups had neither a BPL nor an APL 
card, the small number of informal, home-based outworkers hav-
ing them surely points to targeting failure.
Perhaps even more tellingly, schooling was not a reliable guide 
to acquisition. A remarkably high percentage of those with sec-
ondary schooling had BPL cards, while a high share of the illiter-
ates, about one in every seven, had no card (Table 5). Again, this 
suggests that some education is an advantage in accessing tar-
geted benefits, perhaps in part because it gives people the confi-
dence and basic capacity to operate within the system. Only a 
minority of illiterate persons had a BPL card. This finding points 
to a very high type 1 error. But the fact that a significant propor-
tion of those with secondary or tertiary schooling had a card also 
points to high type 2 error as well. 
In the rural areas, those owning some land were actually signifi-
cantly more likely to have a BPL card (66.6% compared with 48.5% 
of non-owning households). More of the non-owners had neither 
a BPL nor an APL card (14.2% compared with 6.8% of landowners).
Finally, perhaps the most severe indictment of the ration card 
system is that large numbers of the lowest-income households 
and lowest-earning individuals did not have BPL cards, while sub-
stantial numbers of higher-income households and individuals 
did have one (Table 6). And low-income households that had ex-
perienced a financial crisis in the past year were less likely to 
have a BPL card than those who had not.
In sum, ration cards are the basis of a selective, conditional 
anti-poverty scheme; they are both inefficient and inequitable. 
The cost is out of proportion to the benefits they provide. The 
public expenditure cost is the average amount paid in subsidies 
multiplied by the take-up rate (the percentage of intended recipients 
who actually receive the benefit), plus the cost of monitoring, 
plus the cost of dealing with complaints, and such matters as 
closure of licensed shops distributing the subsidised goods. A cost 
Table 1: Time Between Applying for Government Benefit and Receipt, by Caste, 
Gujarat 2008
Time from Applying to Receipt: Scheduled Caste Scheduled Tribe Other Backward Upper Caste 
   Classes
Under a month 17.5 16.7 27.5 32.8
One-three months  17.5 0.0 16.7 27.6
Three-six months  10.3 0.0 8.7 1.7
More than six months 10.3 33.3 18.8 12.1
Not received 42.3 50.0 27.5 25.9
Source: Authors’ survey.
Table 2: Main Reason for Non-receipt of State Benefit, by Caste, Gujarat 2008
Reason Scheduled Caste Scheduled Tribe OBCs Upper Caste
Do not know how to apply 57.8 61.1 68.9 58.0
Applied but refused  24.7 22.2 18.9 22.1
Fearful of applying  17.5 16.7 12.1 19.8
Source: Authors’ survey.
Table 3: Reason for Non-receipt of State Benefit, by Schooling, Gujarat 2008
Reason Illiterate  Primary Middle Secondary Higher Tertiary 
  1-5 2-6 9-10 11-14
Do not know how to apply 72.4 63.9 65.6 53.2     35.1 35.5
Applied but refused 17.3 22.2 20.4 26.6 32.4 29.0
Fearful of applying  10.3 13.9 14.0 20.2 32.4 35.5
Source: Authors’ survey.
Table 4: Possession of Ration Card, by Main Activity Status, Gujarat 2008
 Salaried  Casual  Self- Piece-Rate Unpaid Household Total 
  Labour employed Home-based Family Work 
Possesses BPL card 20.4 37.5 27.8 12.1     21.4 27.9 28.4
Possesses APL card 64.4 51.3 62.3 65.5 64.3 53.5 59.1
No BPL or APL  15.3 11.1 9.9 22.4 14.3 18.6 12.4
Source: Author’s survey.
Table 5: Possession of Ration Card, by Schooling Status, Gujarat 2008
Reason Illiterate  Primary Middle Secondary Higher Tertiary Total 
  1-5 2-6 9-10 11-14
Possesses BPL card 34.6 29.5 26.4 24.7     29.6 10.1 28.4
Possesses APL card 50.5 61.0 63.8 63.4 61.7 69.7 59.1
No BPL or APL  14.8 9.4 9.8 11.9 8.6 20.2 12.4
Source: Author’s survey.
Table 6: Possession of Ration Card, by Household Income, Gujarat 2008
 Under  20,000- 40,000- 60,000-  80,000- Above Total 
 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 1,00,000 1,00,000
Possesses BPL card 35.1 32.2 31.4 28.7     24.8 20.0 28.4
Possesses APL card 51.1 54.3 56.4 61.1 63.3 67.8 59.1
No BPL or APL  13.8 13.5 12.1 10.2 11.9 12.2 12.4
Source: Author’s survey.
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should be added for waste, since distributors and consumers of 
subsidised commodities invariably value them less than fully 
priced items and thus conserve them less well.
The other side of the arrangement is just as complex, and fur-
ther erodes the anti-poverty efficiency of the system. For exam-
ple, a policymaker might announce that “the ration card is worth 
20% of the basket of consumer goods of the poor”. Whatever the 
figure given, it would be misleading. The actual value depends, 
first, on the probability of being aware of the benefit on offer and, 
second, on the probability of being able to obtain it. To give some 
idea of the realities, data from the Gujarat survey suggests that 
about 84% of respondents were aware of the ration card system. 
Of those who seem to be eligible, about 82% possessed either an 
APL or BPL card. Of those, something like half said they received 
two or more of the subsidised goods. 
These figures are approximate, and are illustrative of the 
point. But one can see that the hypothetical 20% figure would 
translate into something like 7%, or just over a third of whatever 
the estimate would be. It is a matter of speculation where all the 
money poured into the system goes. And that is before one even 
takes account of what is called vertical efficiency – the type 2 error 
– a tendency for selective benefits to go to those for whom they 
are not intended, the non-poor. That merely further undermines 
the system’s efficiency.5 
This may arise from the obvious tendency for household 
income to fluctuate. A large proportion of those earning around 
the designated poverty line obtain incomes that fluctuate from 
week to week or season to season. This is well known. If they 
were surveyed by the authorities working out who is above or 
below the poverty line when they were having a good week, they 
would be excluded. Clever bureaucrats in many countries have 
tried to take this into account by resorting to the proxy means 
tests described above, i e, devising a list of proxy variables that 
collectively identify poverty (Gacitua-Mario and Woden 2001). 
This is what has been done in India with the 13 socio-economic 
indicators mentioned earlier. Unfortunately, these rarely explain 
more than a minority of the variance in money income. And as 
we see, proxy indicators of poverty are not closely correlated 
with receipt of ration cards or subsidised benefits in Gujarat. 
There are many other reasons why targeting is so inefficient 
both in the issuing of the cards and in the implementation of the 
schemes. In villages with highly unequal power relations, it is 
normal for the better-off to try to monopolise government bene-
fits. Many people complain that they have no knowledge of any 
survey undertaken to show who is poor or not, as no one has 
come to see their house or ask them anything. Others claim that 
enumerators sit in the local panchayat office, or even in the block 
office, and that who goes on the BPL list is determined by the ap-
plicant’s contacts rather than by what they earn or possess.
We could give numerous examples. For instance, during the 
Gujarat survey, we interviewed a man who operated a small pan 
galla in Kodh village in Surendranager district. He said, 
What can I tell you about BPL cards? The rich and landed of our 
village have them. Many of them have houses built under Indira Awas 
Yojana. This is because the sarpanch has BPL cards issued to his 
family and friends. 
We found similar stories in many other villages.
Denial of cards has been pervasive. The situation was compli-
cated in 2002 when the government of India declared, on the 
basis of the NSS Survey of 1999-2000, that poverty and the 
number of poor in the country had fallen and so decided that 
fewer BPL cards should be issued. This resulted in an artificial 
rationing. For example, in Charodi village, we met a number of 
obviously impoverished residents who said that earlier they had 
BPL cards. A few years earlier, officials had apparently come and 
asked for all their cards. When the new list came out, they found 
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that they had all become APL card holders, not BPL. But they were 
adamant that their income and status had not improved in that 
time; they were all still landless and poor. 
Apart from the reality of who has the cards, there is the issue 
of what happens to the benefits. It is no secret that across the 
whole of India, there are huge and notorious leakages that take 
place at various points between the allocation of funds for selec-
tive and targeted schemes and the actual expenditure on the 
benefits. Virmani (2007: 6) politely described the connection be-
tween allocation and expenditure as “very obscure”. And this has 
been going on essentially unchecked for many decades.
This is particularly true of the PDS system, where it is well 
known that much of the subsidised grain is siphoned off at vari-
ous levels and sold in the open market. Again, the Gujarat survey 
showed this up. For example, in the village of Kamalpur, people 
told us that although they did have BPL cards, they could not ob-
tain any benefits with them. This was because the ration shop 
owner had taken all their BPL cards and refused to give them 
back. His practice was to collect their rations and sell them to the 
card holders or to others at market rates. 
In Ajitgarh village, there were BPL card holders who said that 
for the past few years, they had received only kerosene on their 
cards, and had not received any grain or sugar. In Mayapur vil-
lage, there is no ration shop so that card holders had to go to Ajit-
garh village for their rations, but there even Antyodaya card 
holders confirmed that they only received kerosene on their card. 
We met an agricultural labourer with a BPL card who said that 
often he had to go to the shop two or three times to buy the kero-
sene, since sometimes the shop would be closed and at other 
times the shop owner would tell him that the stock was ex-
hausted or that it had not come. So he not only lost a day’s labour, 
due to his trips there, but also had to pay for the travel fare for 
going to the shop.
What these and other examples show are just some of the 
many ways by which the targeting and subsidy system fails to 
function efficiently or equitably. The examples would almost cer-
tainly not surprise any knowledgeable policymaker or commen-
tator. But if the pipes are clogged, there is little point in pouring 
more money and false hopes into them. 
Towards Universalism
The simple appeal of targeting and the provision of selective sub-
sidies in channelling limited funds to those most in need should 
be set against three types of criticism. One, that they do not do 
what they purport to do, that they have unintended effects that 
are detrimental to society and to disadvantaged groups in society, 
and that they do not provide wider benefits that alternative poli-
cies would provide. To put it bluntly, the reality of targeting is a 
licence to defraud. It is opaque to the point of making petty abuse 
almost a guaranteed outcome that thousands of intermediaries 
can practise with impunity. 
In India, the situation is largely an outcome of the bureaucratic 
raj, which has created a vast system of clogged pipes. The role of 
the bureaucratic raj in stifling private enterprise and economic 
growth has been recognised for some time, and successive gov-
ernments have dismantled state controls and interventions for 
the private sector. However, delivery of services, especially to the 
poor, is still firmly controlled by the same bureaucratic system, 
with its attendant problems. 
Across the whole country, a substantial amount of public 
money is spent on a complex array of state benefits. But they do 
not contribute much to people’s social income or alleviate the ex-
tent of income poverty because much of what is allocated simply 
does not reach those in need. At present, among the worst fea-
tures of state benefits are that they are paternalistic and are 
worth considerably less to those “targeted” than the monetary 
cost of the expenditure. 
 Ironically, given the emphasis on targeting and selectivity, 
state benefits do not appear to be well-targeted or anything ap-
proaching universal, while people themselves generally feel that 
government efforts to deal with poverty are unsuccessful and ill-
directed. For instance, in Gujarat, one indicator of the failure is 
that of all those who had experienced a financial crisis in the past 
year and who received some financial support from somewhere, 
only 0.6% had received any government assistance. 
The value of state benefits is low because they are complicated 
and far from transparent. It is made even lower because it comes 
in forms that require a lot of effort and uncertainty in trying to 
obtain. The net value is further reduced because the costs of ob-
taining access to the mechanisms of state benefits are high. And 
it is reduced because most of the benefit comes in very paternalis-
tic forms. The benefit system gives the impression that it was de-
signed by people who did not trust ordinary people to be able to 
make judgments themselves in their own interest. Because a per-
son is poor does not mean that he or she would not act rationally 
if allowed to be able to decide for himself or herself. 
Finally, the value is reduced because the subsidies that make 
up a large part of the total package available encourage ineffi-
ciency and lack of respect by the distributors and by consumers 
of the goods that are subsidised. Generally speaking, a person 
who pays less than the cost of producing a good or service will 
tend to treat it less carefully than if he or she has to pay a proper 
price. It would be better to provide low-income groups with in-
come rather than subsidise selected goods for targeted groups 
who may or may not want or appreciate those particular goods. 
Perversely, targeting offends all five ethical principles of social 
policy (Standing 2009). It tends not to reach the most insecure 
groups in society; it inhibits rather than enhances the freedom of 
the intended beneficiaries; it gives discretionary power to policy-
makers and intermediaries; it does not provide rights, and it does 
not facilitate or encourage dignifying forms of work. It also fails 
what might be called social policy stress tests, in that it does not 
have the instrumental advantage of promoting economic growth, 
productivity or social harmony.
The general issue of targeting has considerable topical interest 
in the context of two debates that are currently taking place in 
Indian policymaking circles. First, there is the National Food 
Security Act promised by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 
government and announced by the President in June 2009. The 
bill, as drafted, would target subsidised food to Antyodaya and 
BPL card holders (and to a limited extent, APL card holders as 
well). In response, the Right to Food campaign has demanded 
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universal provision of subsidised foodgrains, and this has been 
supported by some prominent economists. 
While there are basic economic objections to any subsidy scheme, 
it is hard to justify reliance on targeting in light of the evidence 
that it does not work. In this regard, it should be recalled that the 
PDS was originally envisaged as a universal scheme for food 
distribution, with ration cards entitling all citizens to a modest 
amount of foodgrains at below-market rates. In the 1980s, the 
PDS was converted into a targeted programme, and over the 
years the Planning Commission and state governments have de-
vised ever more sophisticated methods for BPL identification. For 
reasons we have discussed, this has proved a fruitless exercise. 
Stubbornly, policymakers have persisted. In 2009, the govern-
ment of India once again tried to refine and add indicators for 
targeting, this time through an Expert Committee set up by the 
Ministry of Rural Development. The Committee’s report severely 
criticised earlier BPL exercises, and strongly concluded (2009: 20):
What has been the track record so far of the three BPL surveys (1992, 
1997 and 2002) conducted? Though the number of proxies has gone 
from one in the 1992 survey to 13 in 2002, the errors of exclusion and 
inclusion remain above acceptable limits. 
Logic is then left aside. Having pointed to the repeated failure 
of targeting, the report then recommends even more targeting, 
via a remarkably complex method of scoring to identify potential 
beneficiaries. It defies credibility to think that a more compli-
cated method would succeed where a simple method results in a 
systematic failure of people in need obtaining support. Complex-
ity would merely compound the failings, and make the process 
excessively time-consuming and administratively expensive.
There is a second major debate taking place around cash transfers. 
We cannot deal with that here. However, once again, policymakers 
and some economists are being drawn to trying to make them selec-
tive and targeted, as well as conditional. We believe the use of condi-
tionality will merely compound the failings from targeting practices.
In sum, targeting is inefficient and inequitable. It results in 
some stigma, and high type 1 and type 2 errors, due in part to the 
variability in income, high administrative costs, high transaction 
costs for the potential recipients of assistance, widespread scope 
for arbitrary and discretionary pity in allocating benefits and the 
equally widespread scope for bureaucratic corruption and waste 
down those administrative pipes. 
One of the wider social results of targeting that is too rarely 
taken into account in assessments is that it creates divisions that 
do not strengthen any communal sense of social solidarity and 
reciprocity, or a general feeling that preserving the integrity and 
decency of the system is a matter of social pride. Furthermore, 
targets inevitably suffer from being increasingly complex and 
subject to abuse. Perhaps above all, in the language of modern 
social science, targeting and conditional benefits have no agency 
effects, because they act to erode a sense of common lot and 
common interest, dividing the poor from the non-poor. This is an 
artificial and corrosive way to go. 
What is the alternative to targeting? The base of the answer is 
universalism. Critics immediately react by dismissing the idea 
as too expensive, and usually add that this would create depend-
ency and slow growth. We cannot extend this article by going 
into all the reasons for favouring a more universalistic approach. 
However, we merely note that the Indian state is spending a lot 
on schemes that do not reach the poor. Much of what is being 
spent is economically indefensible, whereas many socially 
defective subsidies could be redirected to simple and effective 
universal schemes. There has been a reluctance to accept the 
principle of universalism. However, one way by which it could 
be advanced is by thinking of it as ex post targeting, rather 
than the ex ante targeting that the clogged pipes system of 
today represents. It is time to transform social policy, to make 
it more in tune with the economic dynamism that is evident in 
21st century India. 
Notes
 1 Actually, there is behavioural conditionality, for 
which recipients must do various acts in order to 
obtain or retain eligibility, and expenditure condi-
tionality, whereby recipients are obliged to spend 
the transfer or their own money on certain goods 
and services in order to retain the benefit. A com-
panion paper addresses the notion of conditional-
ity in general. See also Standing (2007). 
 2 We know of no evidence that this policy has affect-
ed fertility or abortion practices. However, given 
the nature of the incentives set up by the policy, and 
the obvious intention of the policy to affect fertility, 
there should be serious evaluations of the actual ef-
fects as a matter of urgency. If it is not intended to 
affect fertility, then why discriminate against third 
children in the distribution of benefits? 
 3 For a systemic criticism of the PDS, see Planning 
Commission (2007).
 4 Group discussions and case studies also revealed 
a pattern of confusion about the complexity of 
schemes and procedures. Policymakers would 
probably be unsurprised by that. However, target-
ing policies rely on people being sufficiently well-
informed and confident to be able to try to obtain 
the benefits supposedly on offer. 
 5 Atkinson (1995) differentiated between vertical 
and horizontal poverty reduction efficiency, the 
former measuring the extent to which there is 
leakage of money intended for the poor going to 
the non-poor, the latter measuring the extent to 
which the poor are actually helped.
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